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Hydrogen release during severe accidents poses a serious threat to containment integrity.
Mitigating procedures are necessary to prevent global or local explosions, especially in large
steel shell containments. The management of hydrogen safety and prevention of over-
pressurization could be implemented through a hydrogen reduction system and spray sys-
tem. During the course of the hypothetical large break loss-of-coolant accident in a nuclear
powerplant, hydrogen is generated bya reaction between steamand the fuel-cladding inside
the reactor pressure vessel and also core concrete interaction after ejection of melt into the
cavity. The MELCOR 1.8.6 was used to assess core degradation and containment behavior
during the large break loss-of-coolant accident without the actuation of the safety injection
system except for accumulators in Beznau nuclear power plant. Also, hydrogen distribution
in containment and performance of hydrogen reduction system were investigated.
Copyright © 2016, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction Hydrogenmitigation seems to be a possible way of solving theHydrogen safety is one of the biggest priorities for Nuclear
Power Plants (NPP). During accident progression, large
amounts of hydrogen can be released into the containment
atmosphere to form flammable mixtures. If ignited, the
integrity of the containment can be threatened.
To provide NPP hydrogen safety, special engineering fea-
tures for accident management need to be developed.(M. Rahgoshay).
sevier Korea LLC on beha
mons.org/licenses/by-ncgiven problem [1].
The systems that use the devices of the hydrogen passive
recombination are considered to be the most perspective
technical solutions.
An analysis of hydrogen distribution during a beyond
design basis accident, was done using the MELCOR computer
code. The main results are presented below.
This analysis should include the following parts: (1)
containment model; (2) accident sequences; (3) hydrogen andlf of Korean Nuclear Society. This is an open access article under
-nd/4.0/).
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(5) determination of the ignition event; (6) possible flame re-
gimes; and (7) the containment loadings.
The analysis was carried out based on the design charac-
teristics of hydrogen removal systems in the modernized de-
signs for Beznau.
In a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) event in a pressurized
water reactor (PWR), coolant mass and energy are first
released from the reactor coolant system to the containment
through the break.
If the accident is not successfullymitigated by the action of
safety systems, core meltdown, relocation, and release of
radioactive material and hydrogen into the containment
through the break will eventually occur, followed by reactor
vessel failure and debris ejection.
The analysis is focused on the influence of hydrogen
removal systems on hydrogen distribution in the atmosphere
of the containment.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Description of MELCOR computer code
MELCOR is a state-of-the-art computer code which can
simulate the progression of severe accidents postulated for
light water reactors. Several versions of the MELCOR code [2]
have been developed by Sandia National Laboratories for
plant risk assessment and source term analysis since 1982. In
this study, MELCOR version 1.8.6 is utilized for the fulfillment
of the addressed objectives. This code is used to treat the
entire spectrum of severe accident phenomena, including
thermal-hydraulic response in a reactor coolant system and
containment, core heat-up, degradation and relocation, and
fission product release and transport, in a unified framework
for both PWR and boiling water reactor [2].
2.2. Description of hydrogen reduction system
The hydrogen reduction system (HRS) consists of 55 passive
autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) installed in various parts ofFig. 1 e Passive autocathe containment. The models of PARs used have been devel-
oped by AREVA and are currently used in some European
operating plants [3].
Each PAR consists of a metal housing designed to promote
natural convection with a gas inlet at the bottom and a lateral
gas outlet at the top. The horizontal cover of the housing at the
top of the recombiner protects the catalyst against direct
water spray and aerosol deposition.
Numerous parallel plates with a catalytically active coating
are arranged vertically in the bottom of the housing. Acces-
sibility to the catalytic plates is provided by the use of a
removable inspection drawer. A rendering of a PAR is provided
in Fig. 1.
Hydrogen and oxygen in containment gas mixtures are
recombined upon contact with the catalyst in the lower part of
the housing. The heat from this reaction in the lower part of
the recombiner causes a reduction in gas density in this area,
promoting natural circulation through the PAR and ensuring a
high efficiency of recombination.2.3. Description of PWR plant model
The reference power plant for this analysis is Unit 1 of Beznau
NPP [4]. It is a PWR in Switzerland which produces 1,130 MW
thermal power and generates 360 MW electrical power.
The core consists of 121 fuel assemblies with lattices of
14  14 and an active fuel height of 3.048 m [4]. There are two
primary coolant loops (Fig. 2). Each loop contains a U-tube
steam generator (SG), a reactor coolant pump, and associated
piping. A single pressurizer is attached to the hot leg piping in
one of the two loops. Two accumulators are attached to each
cold leg. The Beznau emergency core cooling system employs
four safety injection pumps as the active portion of a safety
injection, and four safety injection tanks as its passive portion.2.4. Description of the input model
The MELCOR input for the Beznau plant is modeled with 43
control volumes (29 in primary and secondary systems, 14 in
containment), 71 flow paths (41 in primary and secondarytalytic recombiner.
Fig. 2 e Schematic drawing of the Beznau 360 MWeNuclear
Power Plant. ACC, accumulator; AFW, auxiliary feed water;
CSS, containment spray system; IRWST, in-containment
refueling water Storage Tan; MFW, main feed water; PORV,
pilot operated relief valve; RCP, reactor coolant pump; RPV,
reactor pressure vessel; SG, steam generator; SIS, safety
injection system.
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primary and secondary systems, 67 in containment).
The containment walls, floors, and other structures are
modeled by steel or concrete rectangular heat structures as
appropriate. These heat structures, particularly the masses of
concrete in the containment and the containment walls act as
passive heat sinks during accident conditions. The contain-
ment shell is modeled by heat structures with adiabatic outer
surfaces. The annulus area between the double containment
shells and heat transfer to the environment are not modeled.
Fig. 3 shows theMELCOR 1.8.6 containment nodalization of
the Beznau used in the present study.
The containment dome is defined as Cell 12. Cell 15 rep-
resents the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), which is inactive in
the present calculations and is treated as a dummy cell. The
crane wall annulus is Cells 3 and 10. The cavity andFig. 3 e MELCOR nodalization of the containment.instrument tunnel volumes are represented by Cell 2, while
the containment sump ismodeled as Cell 1. The reactor pool is
modeled by Cell 11. The SG rooms on the left and right sides
are represented by Cells 4 and 8. The reactor coolant pump
rooms on the left and right sides are represented by Cell 5 and
Cell 7. The free volumes in the bottom SG aremodeled as Cells
6 and 9. Cells 13 and 14 model gap volume and environment,
respectively.
The leakage of the containment to the environment is
ignored. The containment is assumed to fail in the upper
compartment at a specific pressure.
Fig. 4 illustrates the MELCOR 1.8.6 configuration of the
primary and secondary systems used for the present study.
As shown in Fig. 4, the RPV consists of five control volumes
to calculate the hydrodynamics unique to each control vol-
ume, including the reactor core region, the lower plenum re-
gion, the upper plenum region, the core bypass region, and the
down-comer region. In order to take into account the reactor
core thermodynamics inmore detail, the reactor core has been
taken as a separate model from the control volumes
mentioned above, i.e., 56 core cells divided into 14 axial seg-
ments and four radial rings. Eight axial levels out of 22 are
comprised of the active core region, and Levels 1 through 8
correspond to the lower plenum. The lower core support plate
is in Level 7. Fig. 5 shows the aforementioned axial and radial
nodalizations of the core and the lower head. A large, dry,
subatmospheric containment building surrounds the reactor
systems. The free volume of the containment is 47,500m3. The
containment model consists of 14 control volumes, including
the reactor cavity, RPV, annulus, SG Compartments A and B,
containment dome, annular compartment, and environment.
Table 1 shows a comparison between the operating con-
ditions of Beznau NPP and results of modeling by MELCOR
code in steady state condition.3. Results
In this study, a large break (LB)-LOCA is chosen for the analysis
of the effect of spray on hydrogen reduction system (HRS)
performance.
For an LB-LOCA scenario, a double-ended guillotine break
of the cold leg is initially assumed with the break size of
0.698 m2. As the break occurs, the reactor coolant system
pressure decreases. All safety injection pumps are assumed to
fail so that the reactor coolant system inventory cannot be
maintained during the accident progression; whereas all the
safety injection tanks are assumed to be available since they
are passive systems for the emergency core cooling system
injection. As a result, the timings of the key accident events
for the LOCA sequence are summarized in the second column
of Table 2.
A large amount of saturated water is discharged into the
containment at the very beginning of the blow-down stage.
The mass flow rates of water and steam decline sharply
because of the limited coolant inventory.
Break flows after LOCA from the RPV side and SG side, are
shown in Figs. 6 and 7, respectively.
There are various potential challenges to the containment
integrity during a severe accident in a light water reactor. The
Fig. 4 e MELCOR nodalization of the Beznau including RCS and SG.
Fig. 5 e MELCOR axial and radial nodalizations of the core.
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Table 1 e Comparison between design values and results
of code.
Parameter Beznau MELCOR
Core thermal power (MWt) 1,130 1,130
RCS pressure (MPa) 15.5 15.4
SG pressure (MPa) 5.5 5.48
Core inlet temperature (K) 556.7 556.6
Core outlet temperature (K) 587.7 587.4
Primary flow rate (kg/s) 6,940.0 6,938.5
Steam flow per SG (kg/s) 303.0 302.8
Initial inventory
RCS inventory (ton) 98.1 98.1
UO2 inventory in-core (ton) 45.0 45.0
Zr inventory in-core (ton) 8.8 8.8
Total steel inventory (ton) 26.3 26.3
Decay heat End of life
SG, steam generator; RCS, reactor coolant system.
Table 2 e Sequence of events during large break loss-of-
coolant accident without emergency core cooling system.
Event Time (s)
Accident initiation 100
Reactor trip 102
Start of SITs injection 104
Start of core uncovery 170
SITs depleted 190
Start of zircaloy cladding oxidation (1,100 K) 380
Core collapse into lower core support plate failure 7,300
Reactor lower head failure 11,130
SIT, safety injection tank.
Fig. 7 e Break flow from steam generator side.
Fig. 8 e Hydrogen mass generated during in-vessel phase.
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as well as other phenomena, leads to over pressurization of
the reactor containment in the case of severe accidents.
Hydrogen generation starts at t¼ 380 seconds when the
fuel cladding temperature rises to approximately 1,100 K, as
shown in Fig. 8. Hydrogen generation in the vessel phase ends
at t¼ 5,500 seconds and 128 kg of hydrogen is released into the
containment.
The core begins to be uncovered at 8 seconds induced by
coolant flowing out through the break (as shown in Fig. 9), and
the core temperature rises within the accident process and
the core melt begins.Fig. 6 e Break flow from reactor pressure vessel side.After the core is uncovered, heat transfer from the fuel rods
to the steam is relatively low and the clad temperature in-
creases (heat-up phase). The zircaloy clad melts and at about
2,200 K, relocates downward, as shown in Fig. 10.
The core starts to relocate to the bottom of the lower head
at 7,300 secondswhen the support plate fails. After themolten
core relocates to the bottom of the lower head, the reactor
vessel fails due to creep at 11,130 seconds. A rapid increase inFig. 9 e Collapsed water level in the core.
Fig. 10 e Maximum clad temperature.
Table 3 e Limestone concrete composition.
Species SIO2 CAO CO2 AL2O3 Others
Mass (%) 35.8 31.3 21.15 3.6 8.15
Fig. 12 e Gas generation during core concrete interaction in
the cavity.
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of almost all the core materials into the reactor cavity.
The total mass of injected materials into the cavity,
including UO2, Zr, ZrO2, and steel, is shown in Fig. 11. The
molten core falls into the reactor cavity, and core concrete
interaction (CCI) begins.
The amount of noncondensable gases produced from the
ablation of concrete, depends on the composition of the con-
crete. In this work the floor of the cavity is made from lime-
stone concrete with a composition as shown in Table 3 [2].
Since the steam and noncondensable gases (H2, CO2, CO)
generated (as shown in Fig. 12) by CCI increases the pressure
inside the containment, the containment integrity may be
damaged.
Hydrogen generation during CCI is added to the source of
hydrogen due to the reaction of zirconium and steam in the
previous phase (in-vessel) and should be removed by HRS
which is taken into account for Beznau's containment.3.1. Description of related systems and selected cases
Beznau has two separate spray systems in the containment.
The two spray systems operate independently, with parame-
ters as shown in Table 4. Each of them can realize the
depressurization during severe accidents in the event that the
other one fails.Fig. 11 e Cavity mass.The operation of the spray system is helpful in decreasing
the average pressure by condensing steam. Additionally, the
cold droplets from the spray nozzles as heat sinks, also lowers
the average temperature in the containment.
PAR is self-starting and removes hydrogen in nonflam-
mable situations. PAR is self-fed by natural convection and
maintains long-term hydrogen removal.
In the containment, 55 PARs with AREVA model in seven
groups are arranged in main compartments to support global
convection within the containment, and thereby homogenize
theatmosphereandreduce local peakhydrogenconcentrations.
Recombiners are also included in the containment dome to
cope with stratification, and to improve depletion after at-
mospheric homogenization.
The PARs are installed above the floor to provide unob-
structed inflow and easy access to facilitatemaintenance. The
PARs are also arranged to avoid direct contact with spray
water (despite their qualification to operate in the presence of
water).
The detailed distribution of PARs is: four PARs in each
steam generator compartment, four in each main pump
compartment, seventeen in each annulus, and five in the
dome compartment.Table 4 e Parameters of spray system in Beznau Nuclear
Power Plant.
Parameter Value
Starting time (s) 3a
Total spray flow rate (kg/s) 90
Droplet temperature (K) 333
Average droplet diameter (mm) 0.5
a Actuation time of the spray system is determined by an over-
pressure signal (the set value is 0.2 MPa). According to calculation
results, the average pressure in the containment reaches 0.2 MPa at
t¼ 3 seconds during large break loss-of-coolant accident.
Table 5 e Selected cases for study.
Case no. PAR system Spray system
1 Yes Yes
2 Yes No
3 No Yes
4 No No
PAR, passive autocatalytic recombiner.
Case 1
900.0
800.0
700.0
600.0
500.0
400.0
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200.0
100.0
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Fig. 14 e Containment temperature.
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Containment spray system supplies water for pressure con-
trol, restores condensation pool cooling, and removes fission
products from the atmosphere. The distribution and concen-
tration of hydrogen in the containment building can also be
influenced by the containment spray systems.
All of the cases selected for the investigation of the spray
effect on containment and HRS performance are summarized
in Table 5.
Fig. 13 exhibits the average pressure in different cases. In
Case 2 and 4 in the absence of spray, pressure reaches
0.25 MPa at the beginning of the blow-down, and in the long
term buildup of noncondensable gases generated by CCIsmay
be a challenge to containment integrity as the designed limit
of pressure of Beznau's containment is 0.4 MPa [5].
In Cases 1 and 3 the application of the spray system re-
alizes depressurization as soon as it is put into operation and
maintains pressure at a relatively low level (around 0.16 MPa).
Containment heat removal is available for the two cases, 1
and 3, but it has an adverse effect on the flammability of the
containment atmosphere by condensing steam with respect
to the availability of PARs.
In Case 3, because of the reduction of steam and the
absence of PARs, a peak due to the deflagration of hydrogen
occurs, but the containment pressure induced by adiabatic
and isochoric complete combustion remains under the failure
pressure of containment (0.85 MPa) [5].
In Case 1, with the operation of PARs and a low hydrogen
concentration, deflagration peak pressure does not occur.
Of course, the effect of spray on flame propagation is still
an open issue and the other best estimated codes, such asCase 1
Case 2
Hydrogen deflagration
in containment (P ACC)
Case 3
Case 4
Vessel failure and corium injection
Debris relocated to lower plenum
0 10,000
4.5E + 05
4.0E + 05
3.5E + 05
3.0E + 05
2.5E + 05
2.0E + 05
P
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Fig. 13 e Containment pressure.GASFLOW, may simulate hydrogen combustion with the
operation of spray and PAR systems simultaneously [6].
The transition of the average temperatures in the
containment is shown in Fig. 14. In Cases 1 and 3, after the
blow-down, there is a peak in average temperature of about
430 K and in operation of the spray, because of the heat ab-
sorption by suspended droplets and condensation by struc-
tures slowly lowering the temperature.
Due to hydrogen combustion, there is a sudden noticeable
temperature rise appearing in Case 3 with peak values of
838 K.
In Cases 2 and 4, without the operation of the temperature
is higher; and in Case 2, with the operation of PAR, the tem-
perature of the containment is higher than in Case 4. These
results imply that spray without PARs operation enhances the
hydrogen hazard within the containment compartment
(because of deflagration due to the reduction of steam
concentration).
3.3. Effect of spray on PAR performance
Spraying homogenizes the distribution of hydrogen in the
containment (positive effects), but leads to “deinertisation” ofFig. 15 e Total hydrogen recombination rate by passive
autocatalytic recombiner system.
Fig. 16 e Total hydrogens generation in Cases 1 and 2.
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Fig. 18 eHydrogenmasses inthecontainmentcells inCase1.
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droplets and might rapidly change noncombustible mixtures
to flammable ones (negative effect) [7].
Cases 1 and 2 are designed to investigate the effect of spray
on the operation of PARs system.
Fig. 15 shows the total recombination rates of the PARs
system in different cases. In MELCOR, it is assumed that the
PAR operates if the ambient hydrogen volumetric fraction is
above 2% [2].
The recombination rate is determined by the hydro-
geneoxygen concentration and operating pressure. Since the
steam condensation by spray enlarges the hydrogeneoxygen
concentration, recombination rates in Case 1 are higher than
that of Case 2 before the start of CCI.
However, a higher recombination rate appears in Case 2
after starting CCI during t¼ 12,000 to t¼ 50,000 seconds.
The main cause of this stems from the higher hydrogen
generation in Case 2 (compared with Case 1) that occurs when
heat removal by spray is lost, especially after CCI, as seen in
Fig. 16.
Fig. 17 indicates that the remaining hydrogen mass in the
containment by operation of the spray system decreases.
When calculation ends, the remaining hydrogen in the
containment in Cases 1 and 2 are about 106 kg and 126 kg,
respectively.Fig. 17 eHydrogen inventories in the containment in Cases
1 and 2.The results of the analysis show the spray mixing effect
leading to the homogenization of the hydrogen concentration
in the containment.
As seen in Fig. 18, in Case 1 the hydrogen masses are close
except in Cell 12, while in Case 2 the hydrogenmasses are not
in close order as seen in Fig. 19.
Hydrogen mass distribution in different cells of the
containment in all cases is shown in Fig. 20.
In Cases 1 and 2, the operation of PARs lead to the reduc-
tion of hydrogen mass in the upper part of the containment.
Generally, in regard tomaintaining the containment integrity,
Case 1 is safer than other cases as it uses depressurization and
hydrogen removal in the containment.
In Cases 3 and 4, without PARs operation, hydrogen con-
centration in the dome of the containment is very high, which
is not suitable from a safety point of view, and there is risk of a
hydrogen explosion. Of course, with the operation of spray in
Case 3, hydrogen concentration decreases.
The combustion of hydrogen, produced primarily, can
create short-term overpressure or detonation forces that may
exceed the strength of the containment structure.
For prevention of hydrogen combustion, the concentra-
tion of hydrogen should be kept down especially in the
dome of the containment where most of the hydrogen
accumulates.Fig. 19 eHydrogenmasses inthecontainmentcells inCase2.
Fig. 20 e Hydrogen mass distribution in the containment
cells (t¼ 50,000 seconds).
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Fig. 21 e Hydrogen volumetric concentration in the
containment cells (t¼ 50,000 seconds).
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partments of the containment remains below about 8%,
hydrogen combustion is not expected [1].
The results in Fig. 21 show that the concentration of
accumulated hydrogen in the cells of the containment, in all
cases, remains below the acceptable level; therefore, the
integrity of the containment due to hydrogen combustion is
not threated.4. Conclusions
In this study, the MELCOR 1.8.6, as a lumped parameter code,
is applied to analyze the effect of spray on HRS performance
for Beznau NPP during LB-LOCA. The following conclusions
can be drawn:
 As the average pressure increases significantly at the
beginning stage, the operation of the spray system is helpful
in decreasing the average pressure by condensing steam.
 TheMELCOR predicts the temperature andmass flow rates
of water, steam, and hydrogen generation from zircaloy
oxidation and melted CCI during in-vessel and ex-vesselphases, and also assess the containment conditions at
vessel breach.
 With the operation of spray without PARs, because of the
reduction of steam at peak due to the deflagration of
hydrogen and the released through hydrogen combustion
results in a temporary temperature rise within the
containment, but the containment remains intact because
deflagration peak pressure is well below the failure pres-
sure of the containment.
 When the spray system operates simultaneously with
PARs, the small suspended droplets around the flammable
cloud absorb combustion energy and lower ambient tem-
perature significantly. Therefore, in this work using MEL-
COR code, hydrogen combustions does not occur in the
containment.
 The hydrogen removal rate of the PARs system is affected
noticeably by the spray system. Due to the higher energy
efficiency in controlling the over-pressure, the local high
temperature and hydrogen risk, and the use of PARs with
spray operation, is an effective hydrogen safety strategy
during LB-LOCA.Conflicts of interest
All authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.
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